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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early morning of October 25, 1983, elements of a
combined U.S. Caribbean Task Force landed at Pearls and
Point Salines Airport in Grenada to restore order to a small
but ravaged island. At the cessation of hostilities 21
Americans, 24 Cubans, and 45 Grenadians had been killed in
action. By early November approximately 800 Cubans, 49
Soviets, 15 North Koreans, 17 Libyans, 10 East Germans, and
3 Bulgarians had been airlifted out of war torn Grenada by
the International Red Cross.
How did this tiny, nutmeg producing island in the
Caribbean slip into tyranny and spin into an East-West
security issue?
Was the radical, socialist transformation of the New
Jewel Movement part of a regional effort to coordinate the
global shift in the "correlation of forces"?
Was the militarization and violent political
polarization of Grenada precipitated and orchestrated by a
Soviet sponsored political coup?
This paper, with a brief history of the New Jewel
Movement, is an attempt to assess these questions in light
of the documents recovered by the Joint Caribbean Task Force
and an analysis of the Soviet decisionmaking process.
A. HISTORY OF THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT
Grenada is the southernmost island of the Windward
Group and encompasses approximately 133 square miles. The
population of about 110,000 is composed primarily of
descendants of African slaves and, to a lesser degree,
indentured laborers from the East Indies. A Creole dialect
of English and French patois is spoken by the inhabitants.
Grenada was discovered by Columbus in 1498, settled by
the French in the 17th century, and ceded to Great Britain
by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Grenada remained under
British rule until independence in March 1974, retaining
the Governor General and Commonwealth status. A summary of
significant chronological events appears in Table I.
The Grenadian economy is based upon agriculture and
tourism. Primary agriculture exports are bananas, cocoa, and
nutmeg. The economy is severely depressed with unemployment
exceeding 30 percent. External economic support continues to
be the key factor in the Grenadian economy.
The New Jewel Movement (NJM) was formed by two lawyers,
Maurice Bishop and Kenrick Radix, and JEWEL (Joint Endeavor
for Welfare, Education and Liberation) led by Unison
Whiteman, Lelayn Strachan, Sebastian Thomas and Teddy
Victor. Table II lists the composition of leadership in the
New Jewel Movement and the primary cabinet positions in the
Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG)
.
B. THE MARCH REVOLUTION
After Grenadian independence on February 7, 1974, a
coalition between the NJM and other opposition parties




1498 Island named Concepcion by Christopher Columbus
during his third voyage to the New World.
1783 The French cede Grenada to Britain. Imported
slaves and local Carob Indians work large sugar-
cane plantations.
1974 Grenada gains independence from Great Britain,
becoming the smallest independent nation in the
Western Hemisphere. Eric Gairy, with strong union
support/ is elected Prime Minister.
MAR-79 Bloodless coup by the Maurice Bishop and the New
Jewel Movement topples the Gairy Government.
Maurice Bishop becomes Prime Minister.
JUN-80 Queens Park assassination attempt against Maurice
Bishop fails.
MAR-83 President Reagan in a televised speech, charges
that Point Salines Airport complex is a U.S.
security threat.
MAY-83 During an "unofficial" visit to Washington D.C.,
Bishop meets with National Security Advisor Clark
and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam in an
effort to improve relations between the two
countries
.
SEP-83 Central Committee proposes joint leadership
between Bishop and Coard in a calculated attempt
to oust Bishop.
TABLE I. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (continued)
DATE EVENT
OCT 13 Bishop placed under "House Arrest",
OCT 19 Thousands of supporters free Bishop from House
Arrest and march to Fort Rupport. Bishop, three
cabinet members and two labor leaders are taken
into an inner courtyard by attacking Army troops,
shot through the head and their bodies burned.
OCT 20 President Reagan orders the diversion to Grenada
of a naval task force originally headed for
Lebanon.
OCT 25 Grenada is invaded by a U.S. Joint Caribbean Task
Force comprised of troops from six Caribbean
nations.
TABLE II.
NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP
A. BISHOP FACTION
Maurice Bishop . . Prime Minister and Minister of Defense
and Interior, Health Information, and
Carriacau Affairs. Central Committee
Chairman and Politburo member. Executed
by the Revolutionary Military Council
(RMC) on 19 OCT 83.
Unison Whiteman . Politburo member. Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Civil Aviation. Executed by
RMC on 19 OCT 83.
TABLE II. (continued)
NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP
Geroge Louison . . Politburo member and Minister of Agri-
culture, Rural Development and Co-
operative.
Fitzroy Bain . . Union leader executed by the RMC on
19 OCT 83.
Vincent Noel . . Politburo member.
Kenrick Radix . . Politburo member. Minister of Legal
Affairs, Agro-Industries and Fisheries.
Norris Bain . . Housing Minister, executed by RMC on
19 OCT 83.
Jacqueline Creft . Minister of Education, Youth and Social
Affairs and Bishop's live in companion.
Executed by RMC on 19 OCT 83.
B. COARD FACTION
Bernard Coard . . Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Trade,
Finance, Industry and Planning.
Phyllis Coard . . Wife of Bernard Coard and Head of Nation-
al Women's Organization.
Leon Cornwall . . Ambassador to Cuba.
Liam James . . Politburo member and party supervisor of
the Armed Forces.
Ewart Layne . . Politburo member and Minister of Interior
Sewlwyn Strachan . Politburo member.
Lyden Rhamdhany . Minister of Tourism.
Hudson Austin . . Politburo member. Minister of Defense,
Communication and Public Works. Headed
RMC following coup of OCT 83.
C. GOVERNOR GENERAL
Sir Paul Scoon . . Represented the island's connection to
the British commonwealth, largely ignored
by the New Jewel Movement.
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Eric Gairy and they subsequently received 48% of the vote in
the 1976 elections. The eccentric Gairy, however, was
still a hero to peasantry and popular in a land were class
and color conflicts manifested themselves in emotional
elections that pitted the Black Messiah (Gairy) against the
anti-Gairy brownskin professionals. On November 18, 1973,
Bishop and five other NJM leaders were badly beaten by
Gairy's personal armed security guards (Mongoose gang ) and
thrown into prison. Two months later on "Bloody Monday",
Gairy's "Mongoose Gang", shot and killed Rupert Bishop,
Maurice Bishop's father, during street demonstrations. On
March 13, 1979, while Gairy was attending a United Nations
session in New York, the NJM, with the aid of a team of
black Cuban commandos from Cuban intelligence services'
(DGI) Directorate of Special Operations, successfully
carried out a coup d'etat [Ref. 1].
Forty armed men seized a key army barracks and the
island's only radio station, where they began broadcasting
appeals to the citizenry to rise up. Within twelve hours,
Gairy's regime had been toppled. Maurice Bishop was named
Prime Minister of the new Peoples Revolutionary Government
(PRG) . On March 25, Bishop announced suspension of the 1974
constitution, and indicated that it would be replaced pen-
ding revision with a series of "People's Laws".
Bishop epitomized the spontaneous, handsome,
charismatic leader. His political base of nationalistic
11
populism enjoyed a broad spectrum of appeal. At ease with
the population, he stressed youth, education, and the rights
of women and peasants. Bishop's speeches contained little
of the dialectical rhetoric or class analysis usually
associated with Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary. Bishop
took inspiration from the traditions of Caribbean populism,
stressing social justice, nationalism and grassroots
participation.
"People of Grenada, this revolution is for work, for
food, for decent housing and health services, and for a
bright future for our children and great-
grandchildren." [Ref. 2].
Bernard Coard, had studied economics at Brandeis and
Sussex Universities, was an avowed Marxist-Leninist.
Recognizing the political importance of controlling party
apparatus, Coard expanded his political power base by
controlling the semi-secret group. Organization for
Educational Advancement and Research and cultivating mili-
tant officers of the PRA (Peoples Revolutionary Army) . Three
of these officers, also members of the Central Committee,
Leon Cornwall, Ewart Layne, and Liam James shared Coard 's
dedication for orthodox communism. This symbiotic relation-
ship formed a cadre which would later play key leadership





Destabil izat ion of United States interests in the
Western Hemisphere in general, and the Caribbean Basin in
particular is one of the long-term strategic objectives of
the Soviet Union. By carefully using trusted regional
surrogates, the Soviets are able to exploit opportunities to
expand its influence among traditionally non-western third
world countries. The small island states of the Caribbean
are suffering from severe economic and social repression and
are extremely vulnerable to such destabilizing influences
[Ref. 3]. In a politically volatile Caribbean Basin,
Grenada represents an important Soviet strategic opportunity
to contribute to regional instability and to penetrate the
unprotected but vital U.S. southern flank.
B. STRATEGIC RESOURCES
The geopolitical area of the Caribbean encompasses
strategically located islands and adjacent littoral states.
Any hostile presence (military or terrorist) in this area
would constitute an interdiction capability threatening
major Atlantic-Pacific and north-south maritime routes. The
Caribbean Islands serve as both major transshipment points
of Middle Eastern oil and as principal refining centers.
Transshipment installations and refineries in St. Croix,
Aruba, Curacao, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and the
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Bahamas process a substantial amount of strategic imports.
The Eastern Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico are the funnel
through which flows 70 percent of imported Middle Eastern
and Latin American petroleum products and 50 percent of all
U.S. trade. Oil from Alaska and Ecuador passes through the
trans -Panamanian pipeline, augmenting the tanker routes
through the Canal. The aggregate significance of the Carib-
bean for American oil imports approximates the Persian Gulf
[Ref. 4]. The South American Sealines of Communications
(SLOC) also carry nearly two-thirds of western European
petroleum imports as well as 20% to 85% of various strategic
minerals imported by the U.S. from South Africa.
The Caribbean Basin itself is a principal source of
U.S. raw material imports. After Canada, Mexico is the
second most important supplier of critical raw materials to
the United States, and the principal supplier of silver,
zinc, gypsum, antimony, mercury, bismuth, selenium, barium,
rhenium, and lead. Over 50 percent of U.S. bauxite imports
have traditionally come from Suriname, Guyana, Haiti, and
Jamaica. Substantial quantities of iron ore originate in
Brazil and Venezuela.
C. NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING
In the event of war, the NATO "swing strategy" calls
for the airlift of three reinforcing U.S. divisions to
Europe, where some equipment has already been prepos i t ioned
.
Other equipment and five or more additional divisions would
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be moved aboard Military Sealift Command vessels and
merchant ships of the National Defense Reserve Fleet and
NATO countries. The embarkation point for three of the U.S.
Army divisions; the 3rd armored, 1st mechanized, and 5th
infantry is Beaumont, Texas, on the Gulf of Mexico. Three
other divisions; the 7th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions,
based in Hawaii, California, and Washington, would normally
be moved by sea through the Panama Canal, then eastward
south of Cuba [Ref. 5].
The strategic significance of the Caribbean Basin is
highlighted by critical links in the network of American
listening posts monitoring ship and submarine activities in
the Atlantic Ocean and approaches to the Caribbean, as well
as other vital communications, tracking and navigational
facilities and monitoring stations for Cape Kennedy and
the U.S. space program. The Navy's Atlantic underseas test
and evaluation center in the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands
is critical to the development of U.S. anti-submarine
capabilities
.
D. SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION
The United States has thirty-four oceanbourne trade
routes designated as "essential for the promotion,
development, expansion, and maintenance of the foreign
commerce of the Unites States" [Ref. 6]. Nine of these
essential trade routes transit the Panama Canal. In 1980,
114,148,000 tons of cargo bound to or from United States
ports travelled via the Canal on these routes. Total U.S.
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oceanborne trade for 1980 was 770,022,000 tons. One sixth
of all U.S. ocean trade for 1980 transited the Panama
Canal. Total Canal traffic for all nations in 1980 was
183,200,000 tons [Ref. 7], Sixty-two percent of all Panama
Canal traffic in 1980 carried cargo to or from the United
States. Although termed obsolete by some "myopic" defense
planners, the Panama Canal remains the key to the projection
of U.S. Naval sea power into three oceans with only a two
fleet Navy.
Alfred Thayer Mahan noted in 1890, "the influence of
the government will be felt in its most legitimate manner in
maintaining an armed navy, of a size commensurate with the
growth of its shipping and the importance of the interests
connected with it" [Ref. 8]. Few defense planners today
view the protection of merchant shipping as the primary navy
role as did Mahan, but the safeguarding of the merchant sea
lanes is still a primary mission of the United States Navy.
The Soviets view sea power in the broadest terms, with
the merchant marine as an integral part of the power equa-
tion combined with combatant ships, aircraft, and rocket
forces [Ref. 9]. Taken from a Soviet perspective it is not
unreasonable to suppose that they would view United States
merchant interests as a vital pressure point to be tested in
an economic and political struggle.
In order to provide adequate protection for merchant
shipping and sea lanes of communication during times of high
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tension, another fleet approximately the size of the Sixth
Fleet would be required to secure our southern flank. This
is both economically and politically not feasible. Thus in
the event of even a temporary closure of the Panama Canal by
either Soviet (highly unlikely), surrogate or terrorist
forces (not beyond the realm of possibility), one sixth of
U.S. oceanborne trade could be made hostage to even a
relatively weak power.
E. CARIBBEAN TRIANGLE
The Caribbean is to the United States as the
Mediterranean is to Europe. The geopolitical significance of
Grenada is portrayed in Figure 1 by triangulating Havana,
Nicaragua, and Grenada. Such a triangle visually depicts
the potential interdiction that could be exacted on the
trade routes and vital sea lanes by hostile air or sea
forces launched from peripheral footholds in the Caribbean.
Cuba, although a formidable military presence, cannot,
even with massive Soviet assistance ($5-7 billion annually),
project its political and military will into Latin American
or Africa without the cooperation of other nations. During
the height of the Angola operations, Soviet IL-62 (Aeroflot)
commercial transports carried Cuban units to Angola with
refueling stops in Guyana. If the Point Salines Airport had
been operational, both Cuban and Soviet troop transports
could have made the trip to Angola non-stop. Lastly, a major
naval task force is not required to impair the Canal or
seriously impair the sea lanes of the Caribbean. If Grenada
17
.7.— ,•« « iA'^C 'i -r'"'
3- ':.-. -* r--/..;'*-T,
jy^^^ I
18
had been equipped (or staged from Cuba) with a relatively
small number of Soviet made Fast Attack Missile boats of the
OSAI/II or Komar Class, the threat of serious interdiction
would have been enormous. The OSA class missile patrol
craft carries four SS-N-2 surface to surface missiles with
an effective range of 25 nautical miles (see Figure 2). The
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the strategic importance of
the Caribbean Basin and Grenada:
"If Cuban fighters were to stage out of Central
American (i.e., Nicaragua) or Caribbean airfields
( i . e ., Grenada ) and those in Cuba, they could strike all
of Central America, the Caribbean Islands, parts of
southeastern United States (highly unlikely), and oil
fields located in Mexico (Veracruz) and Venezuela" [Ref. 10
F. PARALYSIS OF FEAR
The Caribbean Basin, with its encircling geography,
shallow waters and multitude of natural "choke" points
(restricted passage due to water depth) , is particularly
vulnerable to the psychological warfare recently evidenced
in both the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. In an attempt to
discredit the moderate states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
radical elements, with or without government sponsorship,
have instilled a psychology of fear into religious Muslims
participating in the annual Hegira. Unexplained explosions
on eighteen ships precipitated a multinational effort to
"sweep" portions of the Red Sea in an attempt to locate any
mines. The result of this activity has been inconclusive as
to the determination of the presence or origin of any mines.
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Arabian Gulf since March 1984. Tanker traffic was brought to
a virtual standstill in May with only a fraction of normal
traffic in July and August [Ref. 11]. The low traffic levels
currently experienced in the Gulf are not the result of
coordinated governmental action but rather the combined
effect of threatened Seamen Union action and an unprecedent-
ed increase in hull risk insurance rates from .25% (immedia-
tely outside the war zone) to 7.5% in the Gulf (Kharg
Island) [Ref. 11].
An increased security threat in the Caribbean Basin
would require diversion of vital U.S. Naval assets, create
economic instability and undermine regional alliances. The
U.S. preoccupation with its southern flank would allow the
Soviet Union greater flexibility for political and military
expansion in such areas as Eastern Europe, Africa, the




Grenada's alignment with the East became apparent when
Grenada followed Cuba's example and voted against the United
Nation's resolution calling for withdrawal of foreign
troops from Afghanistan after the Soviet Union's invasion in
December 1979. Defending the Soviet action Prime Minister
Bishop said;
"We certainly support fully the right of Afghanistan
to call on any country, including the Soviet Union
. . . in circumstances such as these, where external
aggression is being faced." [Ref. 12].
Newspapers ("Torchlight" and "Gleaner") were closed and
political opposition labeled as counter-revolutionary
jailed. This preoccupation with counter-revolutionary
activity was somewhat confirmed by the Queen's Park bombing
incident in May 1980. Three people were killed and one
hundred injured when a bomb was detonated at a government
sponsored mass rally.
Both Presidents Carter and Reagan were quick to impose
economic restrictions on Grenada in an attempt to isolate
the Grenadian and Cuban influence in the English speaking
Caribbean. The National Security Council considered a Naval
Blockade and President Carter refused to accept the
diplomatic credentials of Dessima Williams, Grenada's Envoy
to Washington. President Reagan unsuccessfully opposed IMF
assistance to Grenada but restricted a four million dollar
22
contribution to the Caribbean Development Bank, conditional
on Grenada's exclusion.
With U.S. economic assistance highly unlikely, Grenada
relied on the "fraternal" assistance of the socialist
community, Cuba and the Soviet Union in particular. Cuba's
presence was by far the most visible. In addition to large
numbers of military and airport construction workers, Cuba
provided doctors, teachers, and dentists. Radio Free Grenada
received a 75 kilowatt radio transmitter from Havana and
with East German assistance installed 450 tons of telephone
and electronic equipment [Ref. 13]. Libya's Muammar Quadafii
gave the Bishop regime three Soviet patrol boats. North
Korea provided personnel to construct an irrigation system.
Venezuela donated housing material and 10,000 barrels of
fuel.
The Soviet economic and military assistance emanated
from three high level meetings. In March 1980, Admiral of
the Fleet Sergi Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet
Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense, visited Bishop in
Grenada. Two months later, in late May 1980, Deputy
Grenadian Prime Minister Bernard Coard visited Moscow. In
July 1982 Prime Minister Bishop visited Moscow and announced
that he had concluded "substantial economic and political
agreements with the Soviet Union to cut his countrys
dependence on the West." At a press conference held after
his arrival in Moscow in July 1982, Bishop said that
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Grenada's "strategic aim is to further develop relations
with the socialist countries. . . we want to follow our
own way, the way of close relations with the socialist
community, the Soviet Union in particular [Ref. 14]. The
Soviet assistance consisted of $1.4 million dollars to
purchase steel and flour, 2,000 tons of steel, a naval port
facility at Tyrrel Bay and $7.7 million dollars to finance
construction of a ground communications station as part of
the Soviet Intersputnik Satellite System [Ref. 15].
Other communist bloc countries offered to buy nutmeg
and other Grenadian exports at "stable" prices, provide
trade credits, technical and military training, plus
scholarships for Grenadian students [Ref. 16].
In December 1979, 84 pieces of Soviet heavy
construction equipment, 4,000 tons of cement, and 1,500 tons
of steel, together with a 250 man Cuban construction
brigade, arrived in Grenada to begin construction on the
9,000 foot runway, located at Point Salines, a peninsula on
the southwest coast of the island [Ref. 17]. The Bishop
government first approached the United States, Britain and
Canada to assist with the proposed airport financing. The
United States refused the request and others quickly
followed suit.
In April 1981, Grenada sought $30 million in economic
assistance from the European Common Market. After Grenada
received limited funds from the EEC, they obtained addition-
al economic assistance from Lybia, Algeria, Syria, and
24
Venezuela. Castro's Cuba was already providing substantial
aid for the Point Salines airport project, in the form of
materials, engineers and construction workers. Table III
depicts the proportionate funding of the airport. Layne
Dredging of Miami (American firm) was contracted to do the
airport dredging and the British firm of Plessey was
contracted to install the runway lighting and airport
navigation systems [Ref. 18].
The Reagan administration maintained that a 9,000 foot
runway was not needed for tourism and was but a ruse for a
Soviet and Cuban joint use military facility. The proposed
dual capability of the controversial aiport construction
project is supported by Bishop in 1980;
"Suppose there's a war next door in Trinidad, where
the forces of Fascism are about to take control
and the Trinidadians need assistance. Why should we
oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist
them?" [Ref. 19].
Specific reference to the contemplated use of the Point
Salines facility is contained in a March 1980 entry in the
diary of Liam James, "... the airport will be used for
Cuban and Soviet military." [Ref. 20]. In spite of
protestations to the contrary, Bernard Coard in May 1980
signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, which granted
Soviet TU-95, "Bear" long range reconnaissance aircraft,
landing rights in Grenada [Ref. 21].
25
TABLE III.
Point Salines Airport Funding Sources











NOTES * $14.1 IMF Loan
All figures U.S. Million Dollars
Source: Caribbean Monthly Bullitin,
University of Puerto Rico,




Three days after the sucessful coup d'etat by Bishop
and the NJM, the Cuban ship Matanzas arrived in Grenada with
a large cargo of Soviet made weapons and ammunition [Ref.
17]. Coordinated intelligence by Havana and the NJM was
required to account for the normal seven day voyage of the
Matanzas [Ref. 22]. One month later Torres Rizo, a senior
Cuban Intelligence Officer (Americas Department ), was
assigned to Grenada as Cuban Charge d'affaires. On October
10, 1979, Torres Rizo was promoted to full Ambassador.
The quantity of stockpiled weapons that were recovered
by the joint Caribbean Task Force (Table IV), far exceeded
the legitimate security requirements of Grenada.
Documents recovered by the joint Caribbean Task Force
indicate that in the intervening three years Grenada signed
seven major arms agreements: three with the Soviet Union,
one each with Cuba, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, and Bul-
garia. All Soviet arms transfer agreements stipulated:
"The government of Grenada and the government
of the USSR shall take all the necessary measures
to ensure keeping in secret the terms and
conditions of the deliveries, all correspondence
and information connected with the implementation
of the present agreement ." [Ref . 23].
All shipments were free and to be delivered at the port of
the Republic of Cuba [Ref. 23].
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TABLE IV.
WEAPONS RECOVERED IN GRENADA
PERSONAL WEAPONS COUNTRY OF QUANTITY
TYPE/DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURE
AK-47 Assault Rifle 7.62mm
Model 52 SLR Rifle 7.62mm
Lee-Enfield Rifle .303 cal.
Simonov (SKS) SLR Rifle
Bren Light-Machine Gun
Lee-Enfield MK III Rifle .303 cal.
M-16 Rifle 5.56mm
M1891/30 Mosin-Nagant Rifle 7.72mm


















PKM Light Machine Gun 7.62mm USSR 9
SPG-9 Recoilless Anti-Tank 73mm USSR 8
DSH K-38 Heavy Machine Gun 12.7mm USSR 1
ZU-23 Twin Towed AAA Gun 23mm USSR 12
Mortar 82mm USSR 10




RPG-7 Portable Rocket Launcher 85mm USSR
RPG-2 Portable Rocket Launcher 82mm USSR
Riot Guns (Tear Gas Discharge)
Flare Guns
BTR-60PB Armored Personnel Carriers USSR



























SOURCE: "Grenada: October 25 to November 2,1983", Department
of Defense Publication.
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The Soviet arms transfer agreements dated October 21
,
1980, February 9, 1981, and July 21, 1982, provided for a
wide range of light infantry weapons including fifty BTR-
60PB armored personnel carriers. A fourth agreement signed
in 1983 appears to call for still more "special and other
equipment valued at 5,400,000 roubles" and included two
patrol gunboats, more ammunition, and some 300 complete
uniforms, presumably for 1,500 more men, bringing the total
Soviet provision for Grenadian armed forces to 7,800 men.
See appendix A for copies of the 27 Oct 1980 Soviet Arms
Agreement and appendix B for the subsequent Protocol agree-
ment of 9 Feb. 1981.
The Cuban Protocol Agreement (undated) established a
Cuban Military Mission on Grenada, to organize the Peoples
Revolutionary Army (PRA) and provide combat training, both
in Cuba and in Grenada. At the time of the Bishop
assassination (19 October 1983), approximately 400
Grenadians were studying in Cuba [Ref. 24]. The North Korean
arms transfer agreement dated 14 April 1983, was the single
largest agreement ($12,000,000) providing 6,000 more
uniforms, 1,000-7. 62mm automatic rifles, heavy machine guns,
RPG-7 launchers, ammunition, and gas masks.
An undated note on the stationary of Grenada in Havana
stated "the Government of Czechoslovakia has agreed to
provide to the Government of Grenada free of cost the
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following items listed below." The list includes 3,000-
7.62mm automatic rifles with 1 million rounds of ammunition
[Ref. 25].
The large quantity of promised weapons, equipment and
training would outfit an Army of six Batallions by 1986
(four active, two reserve) [Ref. 26]. The PRA would have in
excess of 10,800 men under arms, second only to Cuba in the
Caribbean.
Integrated with the political infrastructure, the armed
forces were a principle element in the PRG. They enforced
domestic and party discipline, provided a means for
political indoctrination, repression of dissent, and mass
mobilization. With massive Soviet and Cuban military assis-
tance the New Jewel Movement was prepared to defend the
Bishop regime against any opposition and would provide the
subversive projection of power into the English speaking
Caribbean.
The security concerns of the adjacent East Caribbean
States (ECS) are portrayed in Table V. Neighboring East
Caribbean States are dwarfed in comparison to Grenada
(1, 700-Jamaica , 1 , 950-Tr inidad and Tobago), some smaller
states (Barbados and St. Vincent) have no uniformed Army at
all but merely a constabulary force [Ref. 27].
31
TABLE V.
LATIN AMERICAN FORCES (1981)
POPULATION GNP TOTAL FORCE PER
COUNTRY (X 1000) (1981 $M) FORCES POPULATION
Trinidad/ 1,200 6.9 800 .07%
Tobago
Haiti 6,130 1.6 6,800 .11%
Costa Rica 2,450 2.6 7,000 .29%
Jamaica 2,300 2.8 9,220 .40%





Cuba 10,000 153,000 1.53%
Grenada 115 0.2 10,800 9.39%
NOTES: 1. The Cuban economy is heavily subsidized through
Soviet aid. (est. $3.0 Billion in 1981)
2. Bahamas, Barbados, St. Vincent, Belize and
Bermuda maintain small para-military units
only.
SOURCE: Strategic Balance 1983-1984
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C. GRENADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Grenada's perception of continued Soviet military and
economic assistance was conditional upon the NJM maintaining
the "correct" revolutionary and ant i -American posture. This
awarenesss of conditional Soviet support was acknowledged by
W. Richard Jacobs of the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow:
"The Soviets have been burnt quite often in the past
by giving support to Governments which have either
squandered that support, or turned around and become
agents of imperialism, or lost power. One is reminded
of Egypt, Somalia, Ghana and Peru." [Ref. 28].
"Our revolution has to be viewed as a world wide
process with its original roots in the Great October
Revolution. . . .We have to establish ourselves as
the authority on events at least in the English
speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of revolution-
ary activity and progressive developments in this
region at least. ... Of all the regional possib-
ilities, the most likely candidate for special
attention is Suriname. . . . Another candidate is
Belize. I think that we can do some more work in that
country." [Ref. 28].
The coordinated alignment of Grenadian Foreign Policy
with Soviet objectives is further outlined in a confidential
message from the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow dated 11 July
1983 [Ref. 28]:
"From the point of view of our relations with the
USSR, our international activity is important from
the following perspectives:
1. The consistency of our political line.
2. The influence of Grenada in the international
community.
3. The degree of support offered to the positions
taken by the USSR.
Our performance is assessed at the following levels:
1. The United Nations and its agencies-UNESCO, UNCTAD
2. Organization of American States
3. Non-aligned movement
4. Missions in various countries (Embassies)"
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The general hypothesis selected to test this surrogate
relationship is whether a distinct hostile shift in Grenad-
ian Foreign Policy is evidenced from the economic assistance
and major Soviet arms transfers to Grenada. The unit of
analysis selected was Grenadian radio broadcasts as printed
in FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) . The
presence or absence of Grenadian hostility towards the
United States was determined by identifying FBIS broadcasts
containing the anti -American code words listed in Table VI.
TABLE VI.
Content Analysis Flag Words
U.S. IMPERIALISM FASCISM
U.S. WARLORDS ADVENTURISM
U.S. AGRESSION U.S. PRESSURE
U.S. THREAT INTERVENTION
IMPERIALISTS BLAMES U.S.
All Grenadian radio broadcasts from April 1979 through
September 1983 inclusive, were screened (see Table VII). In
an effort to reduce distortion, months where the total
broadcast count was less than five are noted by an asterisk.
Intercoder reliability was determined by presenting a random
sample of twenty five Grenadian FBIS, broadcasts to two
independent evaluators. The evaluators screened and
categorized each broadcast as positive, negative or neutral
with respect to the presence or absence of Grenadian





DATE BROADCASTS BROADCASTS HOSTILE
APR 79 18 1 5.6%
MAY 79 10 1 10.0%
JUN 79 5 1 20.0%
JUL 79 10 0.0%
AUG 79 6 2 33.3%
SEP 79 Event A 5 2 40.0%
OCT 79 12 4 33.3%
NOV 79 15 3 20.0%
DEC 79 9 1 11.1%
JAN 80 10 1 10.0%
FEB 80 7 0.0%
MAR 80 19 4 21.1%
APR 80 * 1 0.0%
MAY 80 6 1 16.7%
JUN 80 Event B 19 7 36. 8%
JUL 80 10 1 10.0%
AUG 80 5 1 20.0%
SEP 80 5 1. 20.0%
OCT 80 Event C 8 2 25.0%
NOV 80 12 1 8.3%
DEC 80 9 1 11.1%
JAN 81 8 1 12.5%
FEB 81 Event D 12 2 16.7%
MAR 81 29 5 17.2%
APR 81 26 2 7.7%
MAY 81 Event E 10 3 30.0%
JUN 81 11 2 18.2%
JUL 81 26 10 38.5%
AUG 81 Event F 17 10 58.8%
SEP 81 17 4 23.5%
OCT 81 24 3 12.5%
NOV 81 16 5 31.3%
DEC 81 14 5 35.7%
JAN 82 12 5 41.7%
FEB 82 6 1 16.7%
MAR 82 8 3 37.5%
APR 82 Event G 10 7 70.0%
MAY 82 8 5 62.5%
JUN 82 5 2 40.0%
JUL 82 Event H 6 1 16.7%
AUG 82 9 2 22.2%
SEP 82 6 0.0%
OCT 82 * 4 1 25.0%
NOV 82 15 2 13.3%
DEC 82 6 0.0%
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TABLE VII. (Continued)
JAN 83 21 3 14.3%
FEB 83 13 4 30.8%
MAR 83 Event I 40 21 52.5%
APR 83 35 17 48.6%
MAY 83 Event J 12 6 50.0%
JUN 83 32 2 6.3%
JUL 83 29 2 6.9%
AUG 83 15 2 13.3%
SEP 83 20 3 15.0%
Less than five total Grenadian FBIS broadcasts per month
SOURCE: CANA (Bridgetown), transcribed in Foreign Broadcast




(# of Broadcasts) X (# of Evaluators) - (# of Disagreements)
(# of Broadcasts) X (# of Evaluators)
(25 X 2) - (2) 48
= = 96.0 %
(25 X 2) 50
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The resulting intercoder reliability of 96 % as
demonstrated in Figure 3 was well within the required limits
of analysis. Reliability of the content analysis is somewhat
tempered by the population size of available broadcasts per
month. The New Jewel movement's paranoid concern for CIA
sponsored counter-revolutionary activity is an intervening
factor that is constant throughout the temporal domain from
July 1979 to September 1983.
Figure 4 depicts the intensity of Grenadian hostility
towards the United States during the Bishop regime.
Interpretation of figure 4 is facilitated by factoring the
significant events contained in Table VIII. The anti-
American hostility depicted by event spikes A through J in
Figure 4 appear to be reactions to United States foreign
policy initiatives and not the result of coordinated Soviet
military and economic assistance. On the contrary it
appears that there was a slight decrease, (8.4% post-event),
in anti -American rhetoric following each covert, Soviet arms
transfer (event spikes C,D,& H) to Grenada.
Event spikes F and G are the highest intensity (most
ant i -Amer ican) , and reflect the same common denominator,
that is, U.S. naval amphibious exercises in the Caribbean.
Event I depicts the highest sustained hostility lasting
three months. The catalyst for this low point in U.S.-
Grenadian relations was President Reagan's televised speech
on March 30, 1983, charging that the Point Salines Airport
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Sixth non-aligned summit conference.
Queens Park Bombing assassination attempt on
the life of Maurice Bishop, (unsuccessful)
Soviet covert arms transfer # 1.
Soviet covert arms transfer # 2.
U.S. sponsored IMF loan refusal.
U.S. Naval exercise "Amberdene" with
amphibious assault landings on the Vieques
Islands Puerto Rico.
G. APR 82 President Reagan's OAS adress, posing the
Bishop regime as a threat to Caribbean
regional security.
APR 82 Grenada excluded from regional economic
assistance under U.S. aid proposal C.B.I.
(Caribbean Base Initiative).
MAY 82 U.S. Naval exercise "Ocean Venture" (28 APR -
16 MAY), with amphibious assault landings
on Vieques Islands, Puerto Rico.
H, 27 JUL 82 Soviet covert arms transfer # 3.
I, MAR 83 Reagan televised speech charging the Point
Salines Airport project a threat to regional
stability and the national security of the
United States.
J, 31 May 83 Bishop meets with National Security Advisor
Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Dam in
Washington, in an attempt to establish a
dialogue with the Reagan Administration.
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Event J is of particular significance in that it
reflects a dramatic and sustained decrease (35.2 %) in anti-
American rhetoric following Marice Bishop's visit with U.S.
National Security Advisor Clark and Deputy Secretary of
State Kenneth Dam in Washington, D.C., on May 31, 1983.
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
October 21, 1983, Mr. Dam revealed the substance of the
Bishop-Clark meeting:
"We said to him that we, too, wanted better
relations, but there were naturally some questions
in view of what was going on on the island and the
concerted attack on the U.S. Government publicly as
to whether that was really the case, but if he was
willing to lower the rhetoric of his attacks on the
United States we were prepared to work toward better
relations. [Ref. 29].
In subsequent testimony before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on November 2, 1983, Mr Dam testified:
"It was a friendly meeting, a little formal, obviously
under the circumstances, but a friendly, candid meeting.
I can only say in retrospect, I am afraid that the meet-
ing and perhaps his attempts to move in the directions he
suggested are what led to his downfall and his eventual
murder .
"
In summary, it appears from the results of the content
analysis that Grenadian foreign policy vis?ra-vis the United
States was reactive in nature and motivated of regional
economic and security interests and not the direct result of
Soviet economic and military assistance. Lastly, the
sustained decrease in anti -Amer ican rhetoric following the
Bisfop-Clark meeting in Washington was a bona fide attempt to
moderate the anti -Amer ican conduct in an effort to establish
a dialogue with the Reagan Administration.
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IV. THE " AFGHAN " SOLUTION
A. THE LEADERSHIP DILEMNA
The factors that led to the disintegration of the New
Jewel Movement are rooted in the history of the party and
especially in the interplay between its two dominant leaders,
Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard. The personal rivalry
between these two men preceded the rise of the NJM to power,
and, while this dynamic had surfaced early in the movement,
the extent of their differences over policy questions,
coupled with the intensity of Coard's personal ambitions,
and the covert efforts he had taken to develop an
independent/ Marxist power base (a party within a party)
,
are the factors which precipitated the purging of Bishop and
the subsequent invasion by United States and Caribbean
forces on 26 October 1983.
The threat analysis and subsequent events in Grenada in
the fall of 1983 are remarkably similar to the events in
Afghanistan in 1979. In Grenada the Soviets were confronted
with a strong populist leader, independent overtures to re-
open a dialogue with both the East Caribbean Nations and the
United States, party disintegeration and the ouster of Cuban
Ambassador, Torres Rizo from meetings of the Central
Committee. These serious digressions from "Democratic
Centralism" by Bishop coupled with the American pre-
occupation with Lebanon, precipitated the Soviet sponsored
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political coup to replace Bishop with Bernard Coard. When
this attempt failed the Soviet ambassador ordered the Bishop
assassination [Ref. 30].
The Soviet aversion to strong, populist, charismatic
leaders, such as Tito Amin, Sadat and even Castro, is
supported by the belief that such "personalities" are
ideologically weak and politically unreliable [Ref. 31]. On
the contrary, the Soviets prefer to deal with a "collective"
leadership of rival, and competing factions. Both Angola and
Afghanistan serve as recent evidence of Soviet manipulation
of political factions, not for ideological purity, but to
ensure a compliant surrogate.
Soviet objectives in Angola and Afghanistan, although
not identical, in many respects are parallel those existing
in Grenada in September 1983. In Angola in 1975, the Soviet
support of the Marxist oriented MPLA, was an attempt to
counter American and Chinese influence in sub-saharan Africa
[Ref. 32]. In Kabul, the Moscow groomed regime of President
Amin was seeking a "dialogue" with the West through
Pakistan's Zia [Ref. 33]. Confronted with the unreliable
Amin, factional disarray in the communist Khalq Party, and
Amin's demand that the Soviet Ambassador be recalled for
intelligence activities, the Soviets attempted two political
coups, both of which were unsuccessful. Aware of the
American preoccupation with the Iran hostage crisis, and
calculating the potential impact of a hostile Kabul
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government, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and
assassinated Amin.
A parallel Soviet objective was to counter the large
American Naval presence in the Persian Gulf and attempt to
isolate both Pakistan and China. Likewise, if the Soviets
could successfully install a client state in Grenada, the
United States would be forced to become preoccupied with its
historically vulnerable southern flank, thereby allowing the
Soviets a free hand in both Poland and Afghanistan [Ref.
34] .
Another but equally important objective of the Soviets
is the "springboard" theory. A reliable, "progressive"
government in Luanda, would serve not only as a naval
facility on the Atlantic, but a "springboard" to all of sub-
saharan Africa. A Soviet presence was necessary to check
expanding Chinese influence and prevent the possiblilty of a
rapproachment with the government of South Africa. A strong
Soviet presence in Afghanistan would bring increased
pressure on northern Iran and more importantly act as a
buffer against the spreading of Islamic f undmental ism into
the southern regions of the Soviet Union. The Grenada
stepstone is an incident of geography. All of the littoral
islands of the eastern Caribbean, Suriname, Guyana, oil rich
Venezuela and all of Central America would feel the
Soviet/Cuban influence with Grenada serving as a Soviet
client [Ref. 35]. Lastly, the Soviets wanted to demonstrate
regional confidence in their ability to project and support
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third world allies [Ref. 36]. Both in Angola and Grenada, and
to a lesser degree Afghanistan, the Soviet Union attempted
to regain lost momentum (Chile, Eqypt and Portugal) as the
world leader of revolutionary movements. A small political
investment in Grenada would provide huge rewards of
influence in competition for non-aligned and third world
allegiance.
B. THE AMIN COUP
The second major factor in the Soviet decisionmaking
equation is the perceived threat to the Soviet investment.
Both in Afghanistan and Angola, military intervention was
precipitated by failed Soviet attempts at a political
change. The Soviet investment in Angola was in a precarious
position in the fall of 1975. A factional struggle in the
Marxist oriented MPLA in the previous year resulted in the
Soviets temporarily withdrawing their support for Neto in
favor of Chipinda. This temporary suspension of military
assistance and financial aid was used as leverage in attempt
to form a coalition of the three divided MPLA factions. The
Soviet preference for a political coaliton among the MPLA
was based not only on a united front to counter the
Portugese, Chinese and U.S. supported factions (FNLA and
UNITA) , but also an effort to prevent a single populist
leader (Neto) , from assuming unchallenged control of the
movement [Ref. 32],
The second major threat to Soviet interests was the
apparent U.S. -Chinese "collusion" precedent established by
44
the mutual support of Navimibi (UNITA) and Roberto (FNLA) by
both Washington and Peking. Lastly, the South African armed
incursion into southern Angola in August 1975, placed the
MPLA on the defensive and threatened to unfavorably alter
the outcome in Angola.
Based on the combined support of the UNITA/FNLA
coalition by both the U.S. and China, and the incursion by
South Africa into southern Angola coupled with the ouster
of the Conclaves government in Lisbon, the Soviets abandoned
any hope of a political solution in their favor.
Four years later the Soviets were presented with
similar threat factors in Afghanistan [Ref. 34]. An unpredi-
ctable personality, Hafizullah Amin, U.S., China support for
the Muslim rebels, internal factional dispute among the Mar-
xist oriented Khalq regime, and the real prospect of Kabul
losing the war with the muslim rebels in spite of massive
Soviet military assistance.
Faced with the possibility of a pro-Maoist or pro-
western regime in Kabul coupled with the Soviet concern of
Islamic fundamentalism spreading into Turkmenistan, Uzbekis-
tan and Tadjikistan, the Soviets attempted to significantly
change the political makeup of the Kabul regime, i.e. a
political coup.
Prior to escalating either politically or militarily in
either Angola or Afghanistan, the Soviets assessed the cor-
relation of political and military forces, in particular the
perceived U.S. response. The politburo decision to direct-
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ly assist the Cuban intervention in Angola was in part a
direct result of a power vacumm left by the United States.
The domestic constraints on a waning U.S. role in
Angola was evidenced by congressional cuts in military
assistance, Watergate and post-Vietnam paralysis. In
addition, when confronted with a choice of continued use of
the Azores or aid to the FNLA, Washington acceded to the
dictatorial pressures of Lisbon and reduced FNLA aid to a
trickle [Ref. 32]. This vacumm was interpreted by the Soviets
as a favorable shift of the "correlation of forces" to
their distinct advantage.
The almost feverish preoccupation of the United States
with the hostage crisis in Iran in November 1979 and the
dedicated Naval presence in the Persian Gulf, provided the
Soviets the necessary distraction to attempt to alter the
political composition of Kabul, This same preoccupation of
American political and military forces was present in
Vietnam in 1968 and Suez in 1956. Both distractions were
synonomous with Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and
Czechoslovakia (1968) [Ref. 37].
Confronted with the increasing unpredictibil ity of
Hafizullah Amin as evidenced by Amin's refusal to implement
Soviet suggestions of widening his base of political
support, and the factional dispute within the Khalq, the
Soviets orchestrated an anti-Amin coalition in Moscow on
September 13, 1979 with promises of assisstance to both
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Taraki and Karmal [Ref. 34]. " Upon Taraki's return to
Kabul, the Soviets appear to have organized and/or supported
an anti-Amin coup on September 14-15, their objective being
to establish a Khalq-Parcham coalition government led by
Amin opposition Taraki and Karmal. At this time there was a
reported attempt, with some yet unexplained involvement of
Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, to assasinate Amin" [Ref. 34].
The attempted coup failed, however, and resulted in the
death of Taraki, and Karmal fleeing to Czechoslovakia.
Amin, suspecting Puzanov's complicity in the
assasination attempt, demanded that Moscow recall their
ambassador. This incident coupled with Amin's refusal to
visit Moscow in November and a flurry of overtures by Amin
to Pakistan's Zia, convinced the Soviets of the volatile and
unstable nature of the Amin regime.
Undaunted by previous failures, the Soviets sponsored
yet another covert attempt on Amin's life. General Victor
Paputin was assigned to Kabul in late November on the
pretext of monitoring counter insurgency elements but in
actuality was coordinating Taraki and Karmal supporters in
yet another assasination attempt. On December 19, 1979,
with the assistance of the Soviet secret police and under
the direction of General Paputin, an unidentified assailant
killed Amin's nephew, Assadullah and wounded Amin [Ref. 34].
Faced with an independent, unreliable and possibly
traitorous Amin, courting Pakistani and probably Chinese
assistance, and the twice failed attempts to produce an
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internal change in the Kabul regime/ the Soviets quickly and
without reservation, opted for military intervention.
Seven days after the failed, but close, assasination
attempt on Amin, 10,000 Soviet airborne units of the 105th
Airborne Guards Division were airlifted into Kabul [Ref. 34]
Within hours a special Soviet assault unit, surrounded Amin
and his supporters where Amin was subsequently killed
[Ref. 34].
The "Machiavell i " solution as to the unreliability of
Amin was accompanied by Moscow placing a servient Karmal to
head a compliant Kabul government.
The Soviets, fully aware of the geopolitical
significance of Grenada, were initially content to allow
Castro's Cuba to be their surrogate and regional power
broker [Ref. 38]. Moscow's reluctance in being directly
involved is evidenced by the fact that the Soviet resident
embassy was not established in Grenada until September 1982
and all diplomatic business and arms transfer agreements
were conducted in secrecy in Havana [Ref. 35].
C. RAPPROCHEMENT
The Soviet Threat analysis of the populist Bishop in
the fall of 1983 closely parallels the Amin regime of 1979.
Bishop's visit to Washington, D.C. in June 1983 coupled with
his attempt to establish a "new" dialogue with neighboring
Caribbean states were reminiscent of Amin's appeal to
Pakistan and China. The Soviet concern for Bishop's
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uncoordinated and unannounced Washington meeting was
expressed by Soviet Minister Kazimirov, Director of the
First Latin America Department, in a Moscow communique:
"Kazimirov told me that he first heard of the
visit in the newspapers and that he first heard
that the PM had a meeting with Clark when the
Canadian Ambassador, who was on a visit to his
office, mentioned it to him. . . Basically,
he wanted to know what was the nature of the
meeting with Clark." [Ref. 28].
Analogous to Amin demanding that the Soviet ambassador
Puzanov be recalled by Moscow, Bishop demanded that Cuban
Ambassador Torres Rizo not participate in further meetings
of the Central Committee [Ref. 39].
D. THE BISHOP COUP
The Soviet objective was to initiate a political coup
in Grenada, like Afghanistan in 1979, and replace the popu-
list Bishop with a subservient, doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist
They perceived Bishop like Amin as leading a deterioration
of the party into a Social Democratic party as opposed to
Leninist principles championed by Bernard Coard [Ref. 40].
Coard had attended school in the Soviet Union and had a
clear "ideological" path for the transformation of Grenadian
society. The Soviets probably preferred Coard to Bishop as
early as May 1980, when Coard visited Moscow. Like the
initial attempts in both Angola and Kabul, the initial stage
of a change in political leadership of Grenada called for
the formation of Bishop-Coard coalition. This power sharing
coalition was designed to slowly erode and dilute both the
Bishop power base and his large popularity.
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This wel 1 -orchestrated scheme surfaced in September
1982, during a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.
Coard, disillusioned with Bishop's "spontaneity" of
leadership, piecemeal approach to "democratic centralism"
and lack of "idelogical clarity", resigned from the party's
Central Committee. The erosion of Bishop's support in the
Central Committee was evidenced by the majority of the
Committee criticizing Bishop's "weak leadership" [Ref. 41],
In response to these criticisms, another extraordinary
Central Committee meeting was held September 14-16, 1983.
The session began with recriminations in general but turned
with orchestrated precision on Bishop by the Coard power
faction:
"[Failure] to build the party into a Marxist-Leninist
vanguard in a country that is dominantly petit
bourgeois... We have to develop an army with more
complicated means. Tighten our relations with the
World Socialist Movement, especially Cuba, S.U. [Soviet
Union], G.D.R. [East Germany]..." (Lt. Col. Ewart
Layne, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Interior)" [Ref. 42]
"All programmes of the Revolution are in a very weak
condition, while propaganda work is still very bad.
The mass organizations are showing less participation
in the political work... If this is allowed to continue
the party will disintegrate in a matter of 5 to 6
months... The Comrade Leader [Bishop] has not taken
responsibility, not given the necessary guidance, ...
is disorganized very often, avoids responsibilities
for critical areas of work..." [Phyllis Coard]
[Ref. 42].
Bishop joined in the self -cr i t icsm, at the risk of being
publicly accused of being petit bourgeois, but attempted
to deflect responsibility toward the "collective leadership"
of the Central Committee [Ref. 42].
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However, in the following session on September 17th,
Liam James, with coordinated support from Ewart Layne, Leon
Cornwall, and Phyllis Coard, submitted a proposal for
restructuring the party leadership [Ref. 42], The
comprehensive proposal by James and its almost immediate
acceptance (9 to 1) by the majority of the Central Committee
suggested prior coordination, spearheaded by the Coard
faction. James claimed that the fundamental party problem
was the leadership of Bishop and proposed a model of
"joint" leadership in which Bishop would remain Prime
Minister and Commander-in-Chief but Coard would become the
defacto party chief [Ref. 42]. Other shifts in portfolios of
the NJM leadership were also approved, removing Bishop sup-
porters from key positions. By adopting the restructuring
proposal (Louison voted No, Austin abstained), Coard now
controlled the chief policymaking element of the party, the
Politburo, and therefore the government as well as the
chief administrative organ of the party, the Organizing
Committee. By controlling these two entities, Coard
controlled two of the three chief organs reporting to the
Central Committee (the third was the armed forces, where he
had already cultivated deep idelogical loyalties) , this left
Bishop as chairman of the Central Committee without any real
power or political constituency.
Bishop would be retained as Prime Minister (for an
interim period) because of his depth of popular support and
personal identification with the populace. Unlike Bishop,
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Bernard and Phyllis Coard were intensely disliked by the
people of Grenada. Conscious of the unpopularity of Bernard
Coard, Lorainne Lewis in a full meeting of the Central
Committee asked:
"...how would we bring the question of joint
leadership to the masses since there are many
people who would not like to see Cde. Coard as
leader?" [Ref. 43].
The question was answered by Coard supporter Liam James:
"...joint leadership is an internal party matter
and is not to be brought to the masses. . . the
key to defeating rumour mongering is the pro-
letarian acceptance, attitude and disposition of
the two comrades [Ref. 43].
Table VIII contains the voting results on the joint leader-
ship proposal that were recorded in the Central Committee on
September 16, 1983 [Ref. 42].
TABLE VIII.




How to Inform the Membership:
(A) Inform the members only
through the minutes








Bishop's opponents attempted to manipulate a solution
that Bishop would not summarily reject and thereby prevent
his large following from inciting rebellious action. Boy-
cotting the General Assembly Meeting of September 25, 1983,
Bishop was informed of the full party membership approval of
the joint leadership [Ref. 43].
Similar to the factional disarray in the Khlaq party in
Kabul, threatening party disintegration was evidenced by the
first plenary session of the NJM Central Committee, held 13-
19 July, 1983:




organizationally. At the same time, the emergence of
deep petty bourgeois manifestations and influence in
the Party has led to two ideological trends [one
Marxist-Leninist and the other not]." [Ref. 44].
Confronted with an unstable leadership, western
overtures, ouster of the Cuban ambassador from Central
Committee meetings and apparent party disintegration, the
Soviets "invited" Bishop to visit Moscow in September 1983,
unlike Amin, Bishop naively accepted.
With Bishop, a man Coard viewed ideologically
complacent and untutored in Marxist-Leninist doctrine,
absent from the country, Coard acted quickly to consolidate
his already rising power in the Central Committee. This
assertive, behind the scene role set the stage for the
confrontation upon Bishop's return on 8 October 1983.
The two factions were again joined in confrontation at
the meeting of the Central Committee on 12 October 1983.
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Bishop recanted his agreement on power-sharing with Coard and
challenged the restructuring decision of the Central
Committee. Charged with showing "contempt for the Leninist
principle of democratic centralism", James and Layne led an
acrimonious attack on Bishop:
"We have to be coldblooded and cast all emotions
aside, we have to be determined. M.B. [Maurice
Bishop] is mainly responsible for the crisis in
the party... There have been threats on the
lives of C.C. [Central Committee] comrades as
a result of the crisis... B and P [Bernard
and Phyllis Coard] and other comrades who
took the Leninist position." [Ref. 45].
Sewlywn Strachan continued the attack on Bishop with an
apocalyptic warning:
"The situation demands Bolshevik staunchism. The
leadership of the A. F. (Armed Forces) shares this
view. ... We have to learn from other
fraternal parties. . . .We must be comm.
(communist) in practice because only comm. can
rescue the sit. (situation). Comm. without belly
better hop the next plane." [Ref. 45].
The Central Committee adopted a decision to:
(1) Place Bishop under indefinite house arrest.
(2) Disarm Bishop ("for his own saftey") and
disconnect all phone service.
(3) Louison, Bishop's staunchest supporter and closest
ally was also "confined for supporting Bishop
and spreading rumors that Coard wanted to
kill Bishop [Ref. 45].
Sensing an armed confrontation, Louison cautioned Bernard
Coard that the situation of Bishop's popularity could
develop into a civil war and "that the party had a
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responsibility to ensure that no violence took place in the
country." Contemptously Coard responded:
"They could stay in the streets for weeks, after a
while they are bound to get tired and hungary and
want peace. . . . Williams did it in 1970 and survived,
Gairy did it in ^73 to us in St. George's and it
could be done again [Ref. 46].
E. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
Louison realized that Bishop was becoming a victim of a
political coup, and that Bishop's only remaining hope of
surviving the power struggle (and possibly his life) was to
mobilize the populace in a mass demonstration in support of
Bishop. There were deep divisions of loyalty concerning the
ousted and arrested Bishop, in the lower echelons of the
Army, labor leaders, and government ministries [Ref. 46].
Strachan's announcement on October 12th that Bernard Coard
had succeded Bishop as Prime Minister (evidence in dispute
as to whether Coard authorized or approved such an
announcement), appeared to serve as the catalyst to trigger
the Bishop populace into the streets and spontaneous action.
On October 19th (Bloody Wednesday) , a crowd in excess of
10,000 Bishop supporters, led by Unison Whiteman,
"liberated" Bishop from house arrest and proceeded via the
marketplace to Fort Ruppert [Ref. 47].
F. THE DEATH OF BISHOP AND THE REVOLUTION
Confronted with a failed political coup, and the real
possibility of a legitimate counter-revolution, Soviet
Ambassador Sazhnev opted for the same solution as Puznanov
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in Kabul and ordered the immediate elimination of Bishop and
the formation of a compliant regime headed by Bernard Coard.
A few hours after Bishop and his supporters disarmed the
garrison at Fort Rupport, without bloodshed, PRA troops,
under the alleged control of Coard, James and Layne, arrived
at Fort Ruppert with two BTR-60P armored personnel carriers
(APC's), and indiscriminately and without warning fired into
the crowd. [Ref. 47]. Eyewitness accounts state that the
APC ' s were driven by black, Spanish speaking military.
Maurice Bishop, three cabinet members and two union leaders,
were taken into an inner courtyard at Fort Ruppert and shot
through the head [Ref. 47]. Following the execution, at Fort
Rupport, a predetermined white flare was fired , signaling
the executions ordered by Colonel Layne and the Central
Committee had been implemented. Ewart Layne was heard
chanting "Central Committee orders given. Central Committee
orders obeyed." [Ref. 46].
The death of Bishop was ant i -cl imat ic , it was the
spontaneous, and truly revolutionary crowd, which freed
Bishop from house arrest, that transformed the leadership
issue into one of survival. The "Afghan" solution had
accelerated out of control and once again the Soviets when
faced with the failure of the political coup, resorted to
"Machiavell i" force and attempted to impose a leninist,
doctrinaire regime.
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Once Maurice Bishop was murdered however, the New Jewel





This paper is an attempt to examine the militarization
and violent political polarization of the New Jewel Movement
in light of the recovered Grenada documents.
The geopolitical significance of the tiny island of
Grenada is an incident of geography. The resulting Caribbean
triangle was a political reality that concerned both neigh-
boring non-socialist countries and the Reagan Administra-
tion. The Soviets, although proceeding initially with
caution, rapidly infused the island with large stockpiles of
"fraternal" assistance in an attempt to favorably alter the
regional "correlation of forces".
The Soviet objectives in Grenada were threefold:
1) to undermine regional security in the Caribbean
basin thereby jeopardizing vital U.S. economic
and political interests,
2) to increase the power projection capabilities of
Soviet and surrogate forces.
3) to maintain a credible position as the inter-
national leader of revolutionary forces by
providing economic, military and ideological
assistance to emerging movements on the "progressive"
path to socialism.
The Soviets, confronted with a Castro like populist
leader, untutored in Democratic Centralism, attempting a
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rapprochement with the West, and faced with the rapid
disintegration of party apparatus combined with the untimely
ouster of the Cuban Ambassador from future meetings of the
policy making Central Committee, unhesitatingly and with
historical consistency, sponsored the Coard faction's
attempt to replace Bishop under the guise of a "joint"
leadership proposal. The Soviet modeled coup was designed to
erode Bishop's power base within the Central Committee while
preserving "eyewash for the masses". This contemptuous and
tragic miscalculation precipitated Bishop's release from
house arrest by a spontaneous populace.
Reminiscent of the failed coups in both Angola and
Afghanistan, coupled with their inability to project power
into the region, the Soviets opted for the "Machiavelli"
solution. The execution of Maurice Bishop, three cabinet
members and two labor union leaders, all members of the
original group of 73, indicates a thermidor reaction and not
merely a factional dispute of two competing personalities.
The massive militarization, secret police apparatus,
and the ideological rigidity of the Coard power faction were
an anathema to the grassroots traditions of Caribbean
populism. The Soviet importation of a doctrinaire, Leninist
regime on the Creole population of Grenada was a cultural
contradiction and therefore doomed to failure.
Woodrow Wilson Fellow, Jiri Valenta's sociological
analysis acutely summarizes the policy questions confronting
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the United States in the post -Grenada , Caribbean basin.
"... the main problems of the Caribbean basin are.
miserable living conditions, hunger and unemployment
which, in turn, invite violence and revolution. If unresolv-
ed, the socio-economic problems in the Central American
isthmus , exacerbated by current U.S. economic difficulties,
might engulf the United States in a conflict of overwhelming
dimensions. For the Soviets and Cubans the continuation of
these socio-economic problems will provide additional oppor-
tunities for their own self-serving roles in the Caribbean
basin. It would be a tragedy and a failure for Western
democracies to allow the Soviets to champion the cause of
political and economic justice, while, in the long run,
furthering the political, military, and social objectives of
totalitarianism. Successful containment of Soviet initia-
tives in the Caribbean Basin depends on the more equitable
distribution of wealth and burdens among the nations of the
regions. What is required is a balanced approach to the
problems which can prevent the widining of the conflict in
the basin and its exploitation by the Soviet Union and Cuba."
[Ref. 47].
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NOTES ON DOCUMENTARY SOURCES
As of April 1984 the U.S. Department of State has re-
leased to the public, four series of documents (cited in the
List of References as Grenada Documents ) recovered during
combat operations in Grenada. All documents quoted or
referenced in this thesis are unclassified. Specifically,
the enclosed appendixes, contrary to the Grenadian "Top
Secret" stamp, are not classified and are available to the
public.
Readers wishing to obtain copies of the enclosed
appendix or other Grenadian documents should direct their
inqui-ries to:
Department of State,




Soviet/Grenada Arms Transfer Agreement, 10/27/80
Top secret
AGREEMENT
between the Government of Grenada and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on deliveries from the Union of SSR
to Grenada of special and other equipment
The Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,
guided by aspirations for developing and strengthening
friendly relations between both countries on the principles of
equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference into
internal affairs,
proceeding from the desire to promote strengtnening the
independence of Grenada
and in connection with the request of the Government of
Grenada
have agreed upon the following:
Article 1
The Governm^t of the Union of Sovij
\
shall ensure in 1980-1981 free of.-cnarge the deliverv^o the
Government of Grenada of special ang~~othe r~~gcuipme"nt in nomenc-
lature and quantity according to the Annex to the presen- Agree-




The delivery of the equipment listed in the Annex to the
present Agreement shall "be effected by zhe Soviet Party by sea,
at the port of the Republic of Cuba.
The order of the further delivery of the above equipment
from the Republic of Cuba shall be agreed upon between the
Grenadian and Cuban Parties.
Article 3
The Government of the Union of SSR at t-he request of t-he
Government of Grenada shall ensure rendering technical assistance
in mastering of the equipment delivered under the present
Agreement by receiving Grenadian servicemen for training in the
USSR.
The Grenadian ser'/icemen shall be deputed for training in-
the USSR without their families.
The e:£penses connected with the Grenadian servicemen's
training, upkeep, meals, and equipment in -he Soviet military
educational establishments as well as w:.th their travel fare
from Grenada to the" USSR and back shall be borne by the Soviet
Party.
Article 4
The Government of t-he Union of SSR shall ensure free of
charge the transfer to the Government of Grenada of necessary
technical descriptions, instructions and manuals in standard
composition on operation of the special equipment delivered




to Agreement of October
''
c-C/ " > ^980
LIST
of special materiel to be delivered
to Grenada from the Soviet Union in
1980-1981 /free of charge/
Description
I Unit of 1
1 measure 1 Quantity
Years of deliver'







Grouo sets of spare
parts /I :9/ to RPG-7V
grenade-launchers set
7,62-mm PiC-l machine-guns piece
Group set of spare parts
/1:5b/ to PiC-l machine-guns set
7, 6 2 -mm AK submachine-
guns, used reconditioned piece
7,6 2-mm carbines, model




Grouo sets of spare parts
















1 Unxt of I 1 Years of deliver-/
Description ! measure ! Ouar.titv ' ! l
I 1 11980 .i9b^
with B- H bullet'.
^
with steel cartridge thous.
case pieces 27,0 - 27,0
with T-46 bullet thous.
pieces 97,2 - 97,2
7,62-mm cartridges,
nodel 1943, without clips:
with. steel-core thous.
bullet pieces 6 00,0 200,0 4-00,
with tracer bullet thous
,
pieces 300,0 100,0 200,0
du-^:,- thous.
Locistic ecuicment pieces 73.0 - 75,0
Soldiers 'ca.^p tents for
10 men piece 20 ' - 20
Spare parts, auxiliary and
training equipment on speci-
fications of the Soviet Party





nocTaBKa nepe^HCJieHHoro b FIpMjrojKeHHK k HacTosme.My Corjianie-
HHW HwyiaecTsa .fiyseT npoH33ezeHa. coseTcxofl CropoHoa MopeM 3 nop':
PecnyC/iHK-H KyOa". nopHjiOK aajiiHeauie;^ aocTaaKH yxasaHHoro HNfyuec:
Ba H3 PecnyOJiKKH KyOa k Mecry HasHaneHHH s Tpenajie Oyser corna-
cosaH Mexiiy KyOHHCxon h TpeKancKoa CropoKaMH.
CxaxbH 3
npaBHxejTiiC'rBO Coraaa CC? no npociCe npaBHxejTBcxsa rpeKaiod
oCecne«iHX OKaaaHHe xexHHHecxoro cozeacxaHK 3 ocBoeHHK aKcrLiya-
xauHH nocxasJiHeMoro no HacxoHme.MV CornaiiieHHio HMymecxBa nyxeM
npHe.via Ha o6yMeHHe s CCC? rpeHazcxxx aoeHHOC-yrxaiaiix.
FpeHajiCXHe BoeHHOCJiycanine nanpaaJTHMXcs sJin oQy^eHHH a
CCCP Oea ceyiefl.
Pacxonii, c3R3aHHbie c oey^sKHeM, conepKaHHeM, nMxaHHe.M h
ofiMyHUHpcBaHHeM rpenajicxHX 3oeHHocr.y»:aiiMX a coaexcxHX 3oeHK=:x
y^eOHbix 3aBe::eHHHX, a -ax»e c hx npoesncM h3 FpeHaxia a CCCP h
oOpaxHO , Coaexcxan CxopoHa npHHKMaex Ha ce6H.
Cxax-bH 4
npasHxeJiicxao Ccraaa CC? oCecne^HX 5e3303Me3SH0 nepe-a'^y
npasHxejiicxay TpeHaiibi a ycxaHoareHHOfi xoMnJiexxauviH Heo6xozHMiix
xexHHHecxHX onHcanHfl, HHCxpyxuna h HacxasJieHHR no aKcruryaxauKH




K Cor/iauieHHM ot "
^ / " okthCph 1980 roza
nSPE^EHb
cneuHajTbHof o HMyuecTaa, nocTaBJineMoro TpeHa^ie
H3 CoseTCKoro Coraaa 3 1980-1981 ronax
/6e3B03Me3HHo/
HaHMeHoaaHHe















K nyneweTaM IlKI-l /1: 50/





























i E^HHHua lXo.aK-^ecr- 1 Toc^ nccTaBKH
iHSMepeHHHl BO
1980 .981
c nyj7e« B-32 co
cTaJTiHoJJ mubaofl TUCuiTyK
c nyneft T-46 xHcurryK
7,62-MM narpoHbi o6pa3ua
1943r. 663 oOoRm:


























Ha cyM>fy zo ^OOOQO pyOJiea
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APPENDIX B
Soviet/Grenada Arras Transfer Agreement, 2/9/81
Top secret
PROTOCOL
to the Agreement between the Goverrjnent of
Grenada and the Government of the USSR of
October 27, 1980 on deliveries from the USSR
to Grenada of special and o-cher equipment
The Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
have agreed upon the following:
Article 1
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
shall ensure free of charge the delivery in 19 81-1933 to the
Government of Grenada of special and other equipment in nomen-
clature and quantity according to the Annex to the present
Agreement to the amount of 5.000.000 Roubles.
Article 2
In all other respects the Parties will be guided by the
provisions of the Agreement between the Government of Grenada
and the Government of the USSR of October 27,1980 on deliveries




The present Protocol comes into force on the date of its
signing.
The Annex is an integral part of the present Protocol.
Done in Havana on February " " ", 1981 in tvo originals,
each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being
equally valid.
FOR AND ON 'BEHALF
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA
FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE GCVERNME:IT OF TI-IE UNION




to- Prctocol of "y'*" February, 1981
LIST
of special equipment ar.d vehicles to be
delivered to Grenada from the Union of
Soviet Socialist, Rersuijlics in 1981-1983
/free of charge/
1 Uniz 1 Total I Years of del.Lverv
Description ! of Icuantltyl l '.
^___
Imeasurel ! 1981 ! 1932 ! 198:
Armour
ET?.-60?3 armoured personnel
carriers oieca 8 1 - -
BRDM'2 armoured reconnaissance
and patrol vehicles piece 2 2 - -
1 4 , S-mm cartridges
:
with B-3 2 bullet thous
.
nieces 6,3 6,3 - -




with steel core bullet thous.
pieces 30 30 - -
with B-32 bullet aj\i± steel
case thous
.
oiecas 5 5 - -
with T-46 bullet
. t.hous .




i Unit I Total 1 Year? of delivery
! of lauantityl 1 i




7,62-min AK submachine guns,
used, reconditioned
7,62-mm cartridges of 1943
model without clips:
with steel core bullet
with T-4 5 tracer bullet
5-.T--n ?M pistols
Grcur sets of spare parts
/I: ICO/ to ?M pistols
Reoair set of spare parts
/l':500/ to ?M pistols
9-mm cartridges to PM pistols






































i Unit '. Tctai L Years of deiiverv
Description J of lauantityi ! !
Ineasure
!
I 1981 1 1932 ! 1933





pieces 1 1 - -
RGD-5 grenades thcus.









ES3-2-VO gasoline lighting power
supply stations
IM? induction mine detectors
3 0-mii signal cartridges:
red
green
3 0-fr:n illuminating cartridges
PSC-M portable firing range
ecuipment
RTX company tactical set
Ccmnunication means
Radiostations:
R-104 UM set 5 5





piece 10 5 5
piece 10 5 S
piece 15 5 5











] Unit 1 Tocal 1 Years of delivery
Description ! of ! quantity! i ' i "*
Imeauurel' ! 1981 ! 1982 ! 1982
R-IOSM set 15. IS
R-109M set 15 IS
R-129, used, reconditionned set 5 5 -
R-130M, used,reconditionned set 5 5 -
TA-57 telephone sets . set 100 - 100
P-194M1 switch boards set 5 - 5
M-3M2 mobile signal workshop set 1 1 • -
P-274M two-wire- field cable kilome-
ter 150 - ISO
G3-10-u-l,3 batteries piece ISO - 150
TK-2 reels for military field
cable piece 100 - 100









workshop set 1 1
SR2-A storage-batteries
repair and charging station set 1 1
LgrSistic materiel
?MKh mobile mechanized bakery
plant
. set 1 1
?KS-2I'l mobile kitchen-messes set 2 2





piece 30 30 -
piece 5 5 -
piece S S -







! Unit J Total,
I of ! quantity! !
Imeasure! ! 1981 ! 19S2 ! 19 8 2
DDA-66 desinfection shower
installations • set 5
SDP-2 sterilisation and distil-
lation units on trailers . set 2




B-1 sterilized bandage sets
Individual bandage packets
US3-55 tents with fittings
Cair.p tents for lO-persons
MKT-T camouflage nets











Soldiers' field cotton olive-
coloured shirts, without belts







































! Unit ! Total I . Years of delivery
Description ! of ! Quantity! ' '-
•measure! I 1931 ! 1982 1 1983











lin- waist-belts with plain




Khaki-coloured cotton knapsacks thous
Stsel hel:nets
Kich leat.her boots with rubber
soles
rianelette blankets
Coarse calico sed sheets,
214x126 en
































i Unit 1 Tozial ! Years of delivery ->
! of !quantityl~" j i —
'.measure i ! 1931 ! 1982 1 1983










Soldiers' aluminium water flasks thous.
pieces 6,3






























Spare parts, training equipment
and auxiliary equipment as per
specifications of the Soviet






K CorjtauieHHM Me»3y npaBHreJiicxaoM T-peHS-sxa
H npaBHTS/IiCTHOM CCCP OT- 27 OKTHOps
19 80 roza. o nocrasxax h3 CCC? b rpenaay
cneunajiiHoro h cpyroro HMymecTsa




HpasHTe/iiCTao Cowsa CoseTCXKX CouHajincTMvecxHX PecnyCJiKK
oOecneHHT a 1981-1933 roxiax Ce3303Me3i:KO nocrasKy UpaBHTeiiiCTay
TpeHajiii cneuHa-riinoro h apyroro iiMymecTsa a HOMeHKJiarype h kojth-




Bo BCS.M ocTajibKOM CxopOHbi Gysyx pyxoaojicxaoaarics nojioxeHHH-
MH CornaijeHHH Me.'Kzy IIpaBHTejTscriioM TpeHa^rii h npaaKxejiBCTaoM CCCP
or 27 OKT.-OpK 19 8 rcza o nocraaKax h3 CCC? a rpenary cneunajziHoro
H spyroro HMytaecTaa.
CraTiK 3
HacTOjnuHa npoTOKon Bcxynaer a cH-^y co an^ ero nojinHcaHHK.
npHJioxeHHe s3Jt;tercs HeoTaeNJieMort nacriio KacTOfiu:ero IlpoTOKOJia.
CoaepuieHO a Taaane, " c^^ " (teapaji^ 1981 roza a aayx nca-iHHHtK
SKSeMTLnspax , va-y^-vTt^ Ha pyccxcM h aHr~nacxoM S3i2<ax, npHxeM o6a
rexcTa HMeioT ojiMHaxcayw CHJiy.
tio ynojiHOMO^is no ynonHOMOH>no
n?A2HTEJIiCT3A nPAEHTEJTLCTBA C0i03A







K IlpoTOKOJiy ox ""f^" (tespariH 1981 roaa
nEPE^EHb
cneuHaJTbHoro HP^ymecTsa h aBTOMoeaneft, nocTasJiHeMtiDe
rpeHajie H3 CoaeTCKoro Coraaa b 19 81-1983 ronax
/6e3B03Me3flHO/
HaKMeHOBaHHe
1 EnHHHHa IKojiHMe- 1 roigj nocTasKH
lH3MepeHHH! CTBO ! 1 i




ao3opHiiie MainHHU 5Pim-2 taxyxa
14,5-MM naxpoHu:
C nyjiefl B-32 XHcnrryK
c nyj:ea B3T • xucmxyK
7,62-MM aHHXOBO^Htae naxpoHU
Oea oQo;im:
c nyjiefl co cxajiBHhiM cep-
ae^HHKOM • XHcmxyK















xacmxyK 5 5 -
XHcmxyK 15 15 -
mxyxa 4 2




1 E::;iHHua IKo/rnvte- 1
iHSMepeHHKl CTBO 1
ronbi nocTaaKM
! 1981 ! 1982 1933
BoopyxeHHe h 6oerr?Knacbi




1943 rosa 6e3 oOoii.M:






K nncror.eTaM IIM /1: 100/
Pe.v.oHTHhza KCMiurexT 3Hna
K nHCTO.-:era.M OM /1: 500/
9-MM narpoHbi k nHcroneTaM IIM
2 5-NW oirHajiiHbie nHCTOJierbi
cn:ii-2




















xac . urryx 3
























HaHMeHOsaHKe lH3MepeH}IKi CTBO 1 i i




























uixyxa 1 — 1
mTyxa 1 1 -
uiTyxa 1 1 .-
taxyxa 10 5 5
uixyxa 10 . 5 5
urryxa 15 5 5
uiTyxa '20
THc.unryx 1 1









P-129, OfciauiHe B sxcrurya-
xauHH, oxpe.MOHXHposaHHHe KOMnjiexx





1 E:i>iHnua JKojiHxe- 1_
!K3MepeHKHl cr30 !
roi2J nocrasKH











KafieJTb norieaofl n-274M a
j:3yX»H-bHOM HC^HCreHKH
BarapeH rB-lO-y-1,3



































mryxa 30 30 -
uiryxa 5 5 :-
urryxa 5 . 5 . -
uiryxa 2 - 2
xn r 6 3 3
XOMTLneXT 1 1 -








1981 ! 1982 ! 1983
CrepriJiH3auHOHHo-;iHCTHJin;iiiHOH-
















nojieaiia 0e3 noKca ojTHaKoao-
ro uaera H3 xncn'-caroSyMa:*-
Hoa TXaKH
SpwKH Haaanycx coJizarcxiie
nc/reabie OJiHaxoaoro U3era h3
x.~on'^aro6yMa;KHoa TxaHH
IL.-aia-rra.-aTXH cormaTCxne
3a:::HTHoro uaera h3 x.-on'^a-
TCfiyMascHOfl TxaHH
Oypa;KXH ccJizarcxHe nojieaae
or.H3Koaoro usexa h3 xnon-
'iaToOyMajKHOS TxaHM



















mryxa 400 194 206
taxyxa 400 200 200
XOMIUieXT 50 - 50
Tiicuixyx 5 - 5
uixyxa 25 5 20
uixyxa 100 25 75





! 1981 ! 1982 ! 1983
y.ailKH TpHKOTa."XHh3e CeJIOTO
usera
HOCKH 6e3 peSHHOK oj:h3ko-
Boro iisera
Pe.MHH noHCHHe cojiaaxcxHe
TeCiMHHhie C nOKphlTHeM KO-
pKSHeaoro usexa c np?ucKaMH
OU>lHKOSaHHha^H, r-TaHKHMH
Pev.HH noscHfaie cojicarcKHe
TeciMSHfcie 3a:::HTH6ro usexa c









SCTHHKH C SbiCOKHMH SepuaMH
MOxesfcie Ha pesHHcaoa nououise
0::e.<UTa OaAKosbie
npocTbiHH pa3MepoM
21-;xl2£ CM H3 6H3H
KaaoJio^Kx nor:y^e«iHbie sepx-
HHe pasMepoM 60x50 cm h3
0K3H
Haao-TO'^KH noayuie^Hhie HH;KHHe
pasMepoM 60x50 cm h3 xnon-
^aroeyMcuxHOii xxaHH
Ha30-".o>^K>i xwcJjH'^Hiaie pasMepcM












xac . uixyK 6,3 6,3
Xiic.nap 6,3 6,3
xiic . urryx 6,3 6,3







KaHMeHoaaHJie !H3.MepeHHHi ct30 1 I I
•
! ! 1981 ! 1932 1 1983
no::yuKJi nopcjroHOBue pasMepoM
80x50x4 CM TiicuT'/K 5,3 6,3
cir..<^rH ajTicr-uiHweshie cojizaTCKHe Tucwzy-K 6,3 3 3,3
^exJTbi K coJinaTCXHM OJiHraM TiacuiryK 6,3 3 3,3
KorejiKH a-ir-ONtKHHeatje cojiHax-
CKHe Thic.iuxyK 6,3 6,3 - '
nnaa-HaxHSKH oOHuepcxne mryKa 300 - 300
XcMSHKeaoHii paCoKHe JieTHHe
H3 xj:on'<JaTo6yMa,'KHOfl xxaKH xucuiTyx 6,3 - -6,3
nojryeoTHHXH xpoMoahie cpa-
uepcxne Ha xo^xaHoa nosomse napa 300 3.00
C'/MXH nor.esbie 0(t)Ht:epcxHe
H2 HCxyccT3eHHoa xoxcH UTTyxa 300 - 300
BanacHiie ^acz-A, yseCHoe h
BcnoMoraTe-TiHoe HMyaecTBO
no cr:ei::iiOHxau>iKM CoaeTcxoft
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